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Chapter 1: A prelude to the discussion on minority shareholders’ rights 
 
1.1 A background to company law and majority rule 
The wheel of corporate law turns on the principle of majority rule, a rule that was established 
in the case of Foss v Harbottle.1 The decision-making process of a company is based on the 
rule of majority votes, which means that shareholders who own fifty percent or more of the 
voting shares carry the vote.2 The majority rule system poses great advantages as it allows 
persons with a greater investment in a company to determine the decisions pertaining to the 
management of the company. The majority rule principle ensures an efficient operating 
mechanism for companies by removing the prospect of a few minority shareholders vetoing 
decisions of the majority. Persons that become shareholders in a company do so with the 
understanding that they will be legally bound by the decisions of the majority shareholders3 as 
it pertains to matters of corporate governance.4  
However, if unchecked, the majority shareholders may abuse their voting powers to the 
detriment of minority shareholders. For example, the majority can vote for a resolution that is 
of no financial benefit to the company or the majority shareholders can ratify the wrongful 
actions of company directors. For this reason, there is a need for effective minority shareholder 
protective measures to guard against the abuse of the powers wielded by the majority 
shareholders. The protection of minority shareholders is not only essential for the benefit of 
individual minority shareholders or ensuring equality in the corporate sector, but also for its 
contribution towards the growth of economies, particularly in developing countries with 
emerging economies.5   
There is a direct link between effective minority shareholder protection and economic growth.6 
A country that has effective protective mechanisms to guard against the abuse mentioned above 
 
1 Foss v Harbottle 1843 (2) Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
2 Louw and Others v Nel 2011 (2) AII SA 172 at 30, stating that the Foss v Harbottle has two rules that is, the 
principle of majority rule, that a company’s affairs are determined by the majority of votes in the company and 
that the company must asserts its rights itself (the proper plaintiff rule).  
3Shareholder(s) that own more than fifty percent of the shares of the company. This could be one shareholder 
owning more than fifty percent or the majority ownership could be divided amongst more than one shareholder. 
4 Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 678. Note that corporate governance is 
broadly defined as a code of conduct and set of principles by which companies must be directed and controlled. 
Dennis Davis & Davis Walter (eds) Companies and Other Business Structures in South Africa 3 ed (2013) 447.  
5 Mauro F Guillen & Laurence Capron ‘State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market 
development’ (2016) 61 (1) Cornell University Administrative Science Quarterly 25-160 at 128.  
6 Mauro F Guillen & Laurence Capron ‘State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market 
development’ (2016) 61 (1) Cornell University Administrative Science Quarterly 125-160 at 133. 
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is more likely to attract foreign investors than a country without minority shareholder remedies. 
Financiers are more inclined to invest in markets with effective and adequate protection 
policies for the minority shareholders as this provides an indication of the safety of their 
investments.7 Furthermore, establishing effective minority protection encourages dispersed 
share ownership within a market which is argued to be beneficial to the development of the 
stock market and overall economic growth.8 It follows therefore that for any developing 
country, the protection of minority shareholders should be chief amongst its company law 
reform objectives. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as the Companies Act) 
ushered in improved remedies for the protection of minority shareholders’ rights.9 This thesis 
will interrogate the redress mechanisms in South African legislation and their effectiveness in 
assisting minority shareholders to obtain relief when their rights and interests have been 
infringed. 
Although it has been established that the majority rule prevails and that minority shareholders 
knowingly agree to be bound by the decisions of the majority, it does not follow that minority 
shareholders are without any rights.10 The need for an analysis of the protection afforded to 
minority shareholders is based on the understanding that whilst there are sufficient principles 
and doctrines protecting the rights of majority shareholders and the company, the same cannot 
be said for minority shareholders.11 For example, principles such as the majority rule alluded 
to earlier, the business judgment rule12 and the principle of separate legal personality13 all work 
to enshrine the interests of the majority shareholders. Whilst these doctrines are very crucial to 
the independence and well-functioning of the company, there must be legal provisions to guard 
against possible abuse. It has been argued that the majority rule, when unchecked, can 
 
7 Guillen supra, note 6 at 133. 
8 Guillen, supra note 6 at 125-160 at 127-8. 
9 This is in specific reference to the derivative action, the oppression remedy and the introduction of the 
appraisal rights. These remedies will be discussed in detail in later chapters.  
10 Each company’s Memorandum of Incorporation lays out the rights and duties of the shareholders. 
Furthermore, the Companies Act provides relief that is specific to minority shareholders. The following 
sections will provide a full discussion on the said reliefs.  
11 This is evidence by the fact that minority shareholder rights are the exception to the rule and not the rule 
itself. The courts’ starting point is usually upholding the corporate principles of majority rule and the business 
judgment rule.  
12 The business judgment rule is a common law principle which has been codified under section 76 (4) of the 
Companies Act. It means that a director is not in breach of his duties if he or she had taken reasonably diligent 
steps to inform him/herself of the matter in question and had a rational basis for believing that his or her 
decision was in the best interests of the company. 
13 This is a common law principle that establishes the juristic personality of a corporation and its independence 
from its shareholders. There are legal consequences flowing from this which will be discussed in chapter two.  
9 
 
encourage or aid acts of self-dealing and or oppressive acts.14 The situation created is an 
imbalance in the protection of rights afforded to the parties which balance is crucial to the 
functioning of the company. The continued abuse of corporate powers will culminate in stifled 
shareholders’ activism, erosion of corporate governance principles and the loss of confidence 
by investors in the system.  
The existence of robust shareholders’ remedies can encourage shareholders to actively 
challenge the decisions of the board of directors and management. This in turn, encourages 
proper corporate governance practices. 
South Africa has minority shareholder protection measures to guard against the abuses 
mentioned above. There are various legal measures contained within the Companies Act. This 
thesis will focus on three particular remedies, namely, the derivative action, appraisal rights, 
and the oppression remedy. 
 
1.2 Aims of the thesis  
The aim of this research is to determine whether minority shareholders are adequately protected 
under the Companies Act in South Africa. To that effect, this paper will consist of a discussion 
of the three main minority protection provisions, each provision will be critiqued separately in 
order to judge the practical effectiveness.  
South Africa is not the only African country that has embarked on the journey to reform its 
company laws, specifically provisions protecting minority shareholders. Other developing 
countries have prioritised the improvement of minority shareholder protection. Zimbabwe has 
for the past several years been working on reforms to its Companies Act.15The paper will also 
consist of a comparison of the South African company law to the new Companies and Other 
Business Entities Act of Zimbabwe.16   
 
1.3 Research questions 
This research will attempt to answer the following question: 
 
14 Peter J. Horne, ‘Suppressing minority Shareholder Oppression’ (2013)16.2 Duquesne Business law Journal at 
205. 
15 As evidence by the Zimbabwean Companies and Other Business Entities Act, 2018.   
16 Companies and Other Business Entities Act, 2018. 
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How can the legislative provisions, providing for the protection of minority shareholders be 
improved or supplemented in a way that ensures the availability of effective and practical 
redress measures for minority shareholders? 
 
1.4 Significance of the thesis 
The introduction has highlighted that the laws on the protection of minority shareholders have 
a direct impact on the economic growth and should, therefore, be prioritised. The significance 
of this thesis is to provide a critique of three specific minority protection provisions in the 
Companies Act and highlight the shortfalls of these remedies. Following that, this thesis will 
recommend amendments to the legislation that will contribute towards achieving reasonable 
levels of practicality and effectiveness in the implementation of those remedies. Finally, this 
thesis will also highlight the role of the courts in achieving the balance between majority and 
minority shareholders.  
 
1.5 Methodology 
This thesis will be conducted by reviewing South African literature that is published in various 
primary and secondary sources. The research will refer to key South African statutes namely, 
the South African Companies Act, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter referred to as the Constitution) and the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 
2000. Parallel statutes of Zimbabwe, Canada, and the United States of America will also be 
referenced throughout this thesis. 
Additionally, this thesis will review case law relating to the subject and the ratio of those cases 
will be analysed. The role of the courts in interpreting certain legal provisions will be important 
in assessing whether the courts have adopted a liberal or restrictive approach to the issue of 
protecting minority shareholders. 
A comparative analysis will be conducted to evaluate how South African company law has 
dealt with the issue of the protection of minority shareholders. This thesis will therefore 
compare and contrast South African and Zimbabwean legislation and case law on minority 
shareholder remedies. This will be achieved by evaluating how the two nations implement and 
apply legislation providing for the protection of minority shareholders. As part of this analysis, 
this thesis will review what Zimbabwe can learn from the South African system   
11 
 
1.6 Chapter outline 
Chapter two will discuss the derivative action as outlined in section 165 of the Companies Act. 
This chapter will provide a brief history of the foundations of the derivative action and its 
evolution. This background will serve as a point of departure for further discussion relating to 
the class of persons who can use the remedy, the procedures, the various tests outlined, the 
available relief and the burden of costs. Chapter two will also provide a discussion of the case 
law pertaining to the derivative action. Finally, chapter two will compare and contrast the 
derivative action in Zimbabwe to South Africa.  
Chapter three will review the appraisal rights provided for under section 164 of the Companies 
Act. This chapter will focus on the purpose of appraisal rights to minority shareholders and the 
companies’ outlook on the effect of appraisal rights. More importantly, chapter three will focus 
on the procedural aspects of asserting appraisal rights and their impact on minority 
shareholders and companies involved. Finally, chapter three will compare appraisal rights in 
Zimbabwe to South Africa.  
Chapter four will be a discussion of the oppression remedy as provided for under section 163 
of the Companies Act. This section will discuss the various situations that justify the 
application of the oppression remedy. There is a list of legal requirements that the shareholder 
must satisfy before the court can grant them relief. Therefore, this thesis will investigate the 
reasonableness of satisfying those legal requirements. The courts’ approach in interpreting this 
remedy and the responsibilities of the shareholders will also be examined.  Furthermore, this 
thesis will deal with the definitions of various concepts that form the core of this remedy. 
Chapter four will also deal with the procedural requirements and relief orders from which the 
courts can choose and their suitability to affected minorities. Finally, chapter four will compare 
the Zimbabwean application of the remedy to South Africa. 
Chapter five will conclude with a summary of the findings on the three remedies with respect 
to South Africa and Zimbabwe. Following the summary, there will be recommendations on 
steps and policies that the legislator, the beneficiaries of remedies and the respective nations of 
South Africa and Zimbabwe can implement to improve the effectiveness of the derivative 




Chapter 2: A discussion of the derivative action in South Africa 
 
2.1 An introduction to the South African derivative action 
South African company law recognises the principle of separate legal personality as established 
in the case of Salomon v Salomon.17 This principle acknowledges that a company is a juristic 
person distinct from its shareholders and directors.18 Furthermore, the company can sue and be 
sued for its rights and obligations respectively in its own name, through the persons managing 
it.19 In the case of Foss v Harbottle, the court established the proper plaintiff principle which 
means that in an action in respect of a wrong alleged against the company, the proper plaintiff 
is prima facie the company itself.20 As explained in Wallersteiner v Moir the proper plaintiff 
rule in Foss v Harbottle is easy to enforce when the company is wronged by outsiders or by 
the minority.21 In such instances, the majority can simply call for a general meeting in terms 
of the Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI)22 of the company and resolve to institute legal 
action to enforce the company's rights. However, this is not the case when the wrongdoers are 
in control of the company or when they hold the majority vote.23 In such instances, the 
directors, with the support of the majority shareholders may decline to commence litigation for 
the company for fear that their actions will be brought to light and they are reprimanded.24 
In the interests of justice, the courts will recognise a few exceptions to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle and shareholders or other persons may be allowed to bring an action in their own 
name on behalf of the company against the wrongdoers.25 The courts will allow this where it 
is clear that the wrongdoers are in control of the company, and through their power, will not 
allow any action to be brought in the name of the company.26 Lord Denning justified the need 
for the exceptions stating that, ‘…in one way or another some means must be found for the 
company to sue. Otherwise, the law would fail in its purpose. Injustice would be done without 
 
17 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 1896 UKHL1, 1897 AC at 22.  
18 JCI Letseng diamonds citing John Shaw and Sons (Silford Ltd v Shaw) 1935 (2) KB 113 (CA) at 134. 
19 Farouk HI Cassim (ed), Maleka Femida Cassim, Rehana Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 
at 31 (hereafter Contemporary Company Law). 
20 Foss v Harbottle 1843 (2) Hare 461; 67 ER at 189 (hereafter Foss v Harbottle). 
21 Wallersteiner v Moir (No.2) 1975 (1) ALL ER at 849 (CA) (hereafter Wallersteiner v Moir). 
22This is defined as a document that amounts to a constitution of the company, which sets out the rights, duties 
of shareholders and directors, the authorized share capital of the company and other matters. Companies and 
Other Business Structures glossary at 452. 
23 Minister of Mines & Mining Development & Others v Grandwell Holdings (Pvt) Ltd & Others SC 34/18|1. 
24 Wallersteiner v Moir (No2) [1975] 1 AII ER 849 (CA) at 875 d-f. 
25 L. Piras & Son (Pvt) Ltd & Another Intervening v Piras 1993 (2) ZLR at 245 where the Chief Justice upheld the 
ruling of the lower court arguing that the derivative action is such an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 
The court allowed the defendant to intervene to protect the interests of the company. 
26 James Thomas Riley Gibson, Coenraad Visser South African Mercantile & Company Law 8 ed (2003) 370-371. 
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redress.’27 Allowing minority shareholders to bring a derivative action affords the company 
justice and the wrongdoers are held accountable. Therefore, the derivative action provides the 
answer in allowing persons other than the company to sue on behalf of the company. The 
derivative action can be described as a two-fold action. On one hand, it is the equivalent of a 
suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue and on the other, it is a suit by the 
corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to it.28  
The derivative action has gone through an evolution in South Africa. The evolution has seen a 
departure from the restrictive common law derivative action that offered little help to minority 
shareholders to a codified derivative action29 that serves the interests of minority shareholders 
better.30 Section 165 of the Companies Act begins with the abolition of the common law 
derivative action which had co-existed with section 266 of the old Companies Act 61 of 1973.31 
Any derivative action brought before the courts must be done within the parameters of section 
165 of the Companies Act. The derivative action was expanded and improved specifically in 
terms of the cause of action, the identity of the wrongdoer and persons who have legal standing 
to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the company.32 The following sections will discuss 
these three areas in more depth. 
As stated above, the derivative action is an exception to the general rule that shareholders 
cannot institute proceedings on behalf of the company. The derivative action must be 
distinguished from direct action, for example, an application for relief from oppressive 
conduct.33 The latter is a direct application made by a shareholder in their personal capacity, 
for wrongs committed against them whereas the former is for wrongs committed against the 
company.34 In essence, the derivative action affords persons with an interest in pursuing justice 
and obtaining redress for a company the channel to do so where the company declines to do 
so.35  
 
27 Wallersteiner v Moir (No2) 1975 (1) ALL ER 849 (CA) at 857 f. 
28 Aronson v Lewis (Del. 1984) 473 A.2d at 805-811. 
29 The Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] specifies that section 
165 of the Companies Act codifies and streamlines the derivative action together with the elimination of the 
common law derivative action.  
30 Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act, Mann Report RP 45/1970 at 42.10-18 stated 
that the common law- derivative action was stringently limited by the Foss v Harbottle rule, had such a narrow 
field as to be virtually insignificant, and was beset with procedural difficulties.  
31 Companies Act, section 165 (1). 
32 Contemporary Company Law at 777.  
33 The term oppressive conduct will be discussed in later chapter four. 
34 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 165(2).  
35 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam & Others 2016 ZAWCHC 130 at 49. 
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Any person approaching the courts for relief must, in terms of the Companies Act, satisfy the 
stated legal requirements before the courts can grant relief.36 The litigant must prove that they 
have legal standing and that the company has refused to file the lawsuit.37 In addition, the 
litigant must establish the merits of their case by satisfying various tests.38 This thesis will 
focus on the legal requirements and how they affect minority shareholders intending to enforce 
their rights and seek protection from the courts.  
 
2.2 Discussing persons with legal standing under section 165   
In terms of section 165 (2) of the Companies Act, the derivative action can be brought by the 
following classes of people: shareholders, directors or prescribed officers of the company or a 
related company, registered trade unions or other employee representatives and any persons 
granted leave by the courts to bring such a suit. This is a wide pool of persons which extends 
to more than just minority shareholders. This is a positive development, allowing other persons 
with the means to bring an action on behalf of the company the legal avenue to do so. The 
inclusion of trade unions increases the prospects of minority shareholders attaining relief, 
particularly for employees participating in employee ownership schemes39 and therefore have 
interests to protect. Whilst shareholders might be able to condone a loss, it is the employees 
who might bear the loss in the form of wage and salary cuts. Therefore, such parties must be 
allowed to approach the courts where necessary.40  The court also has the discretion to allow 
any other persons it deems fit to commence or continue litigation on behalf of the company.41  
This is a recognition that persons other than shareholders also have a legitimate and cognisable 
interest in the assertion or defence of a company’s legal interests. 
2.3 The procedure under section 165 of the Companies Act 
A litigant is required to serve a demand on the company to commence or continue legal action 
in order to act on behalf of the company before making an application to the court.42 This is to 
afford the company time to conduct its due process and apply its judgment on the merits of the 
 
36 Companies Act, section 165(12). 
37 Companies Act, section 165(2). 
38 Companies Act, section 165(5)(b). 
39 Defined as a scheme established by a company by either a means of a trust or otherwise for the purpose of 
offering participation to employees, by means of issue of shares in the company. Companies Act, section 95 (1) 
(c). 
40 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam & Others 2016 ZAWCHC 130 at 33. 
41 Companies Act, section 165(2)(d). 
42 Companies Act, section 165(2).  
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allegation.43 Pursuant to receiving such a demand, the company has the option to first issue an 
outright refusal followed by an application to the court to dismiss the applicant’s demand44 and 
secondly the appointment of an independent person to investigate the demand and the 
surrounding circumstances and report to the board of directors.45 This may also be followed by 
the company’s decision to proceed with the suit 
The Companies Act does not prescribe what the demand served on the company should 
contain. However, the courts argued that if a demand is to withstand a challenge from the 
directors, it must have a substantial claim in respect of the matter because the demand will be 
used as a framework for the independent investigation.46The demand must have cogency, albeit 
not with the precision required for pleadings but it must provide the basis for the company to 
institute or continue with litigation.47 The demand on the company and the application for leave 
serve to provide a filter to sift meritless cases. Furthermore, the statutory provision requiring 
the independent investigator to report to the board of directors and not to the complainant 
ensures that the demand process is not used by litigants as a fishing expedition for facts to 
establish an action.48  
Although the appointment of an independent investigator should be applauded, the unilateral 
appointment of the expert pose’s questions of whether the investigator can be impartial. The 
investigator is appointed and remunerated by the company.49 Leaving the selection of the 
investigator to one party leaves room for bias, for example, the company could choose an 
investigator that is sympathetic to the majority’s agenda.50 The Companies Act does not 
mention the extent of the cooperation required of the company during the investigation. It is 
submitted that the appointment of an impartial investigator must be done with the input of both 
the litigant and the company. If the company consulted the litigant during the appointment of 
the independent investigator it would eliminate any suspicion of bias, as was stated in the case 
of R v Sussex Justice Exparte McCarthy ‘not only must justice be done, it must also be seen to 
 
43 Companies Act, section 165(4). The company completes this process through the mandated hiring of an 
independent investigator who must assess the complaint and give recommendations on whether the company 
should commence litigation.  
44 Companies Act, section 165(3). 
45 Companies Act, section 165(4)(a).   
46 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam & Others (3) 2017 SA 15 at 56. 
47Lewis Group Limited v Woollam & Others (3) 2017 SA 15 at 47. 
48 The scope of the investigation is limited to the particular claim and the facts surrounding it through section 
165 (4) (a) (i). 
49 Companies Act, section 165(4)(a). 
50Lewis Group Limited v Woollam & Others (3) 2017 SA 15 at 45. 
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be done.’51 Thus, allowing the input of the litigant in the selection process will to an extent 
validate the impartiality of the investigating officer and instil confidence of the litigant in the 
report.  
 
2.4 A scrutiny of the legal requirements 
 
2.4.1 The test for a show of good faith  
To minimise the risk of flooding the courts with meritless derivative litigation, the legislature 
placed safeguards or requirements that each litigant must satisfy before the court can hear an 
application.52 Once the litigant has established their legal standing, they must satisfy the court 
that the application is made in good faith in accordance with section 165(5)(b)(i) of the 
Companies Act. The Companies Act does not, however, provide a definition for good faith. 
An illuminating discussion regarding the criterion of good faith has been offered.53 It has been 
said that the doctrine of good faith is an elusive subject, whose interpretation can be understood 
from the meaning of common law principles together with the directors’ fiduciary duty to act 
in good faith and in the best interests of the company.54   
The court in Mouritzen v Greystone explained that a litigant that demonstrates ‘good 
conscience and sincere belief on the existence of reasonable prospects of success in the 
proposed litigation and, therefore, the absence of ulterior motive, on the part of an applicant' 
would have demonstrated the good faith.55  In Swanson v Pratt, it was explained that the court 
will consider whether the litigant believes that the case is based on a good cause of action which 
has a reasonable prospect of success. However, if the litigant is bringing the suit for a collateral 
purpose that would amount to an abuse of the process. 56 
The first step in ascertaining good faith involves both a subjective and an objective test. The 
subjective test questions whether or not the litigant honestly believes that there is a valid cause 
of action whilst the objective test questions whether a reasonable man in the position of the 
 
51 R v Sussex Justice Exparte McCarthy KB EWHC at 256. 
52Maleka Femida Cassim The statutory derivative action under the companies Act of 2008, Guidelines for the 
exercise of the judicial discretion. (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) at 34. 
53 Maleka Femida Cassim ‘The statutory derivative action under the Companies Act of 2008: The role of good 
faith’ (2013) 130 (3) SALJ at 496-526. 
54 Maleka Femida Cassim The statutory derivative action under the companies Act of 2008, Guidelines for the 
exercise of the judicial discretion. (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) at 30. 
55 Mouritzen v Greystone Enterprises (Pty) Ltd & Another 2012 (5) S KZD at 103. 
56 Swansson v Pratt 2002 (42) ACSR 313.  
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litigant would believe that a valid cause of action exists.57 However, it is a difficult task for the 
courts to measure a litigant’s belief in their case. The courts simply will not accept a bold 
assertion, therefore the litigant must provide a cause for belief.58 In Mbethe v Manganese, the 
courts emphasised the point that a mere assertion by the litigant will not suffice.59 Qualifying 
that although the good faith test is in nature subjective as it relates to the mind of the litigant it 
must therefore, be subjected to an objective test.60 The courts can only determine the state of 
mind of the litigant by drawing inferences from the objective facts as they appear from the 
evidence submitted by the litigant.61 In order to satisfy this test, the litigant would require 
evidence in the form of company records which the litigant might not have access to. Therefore, 
the company must allow sufficient access to the company records for minority shareholders to 
successfully prepare their case. 
Nevertheless, in other jurisdictions, the courts have allowed actions to proceed based upon the 
information and the belief of others.62 The courts acknowledged that minority shareholders are 
invariably at a disadvantaged position preventing them from obtaining first-hand evidence and 
information upon which to base their application.63In interrogating the second aspect of the 
test, the litigant must satisfy the court that bringing the suit would not amount to an abuse of 
the process but is a necessary act in pursuit of the best interests of the company.64 
2.4.2 The test for the trial of a serious question 
A litigant must satisfy the court that the derivative action is neither frivolous nor vexatious.65 
The litigant is required to show that there is a serious question to be tried that is of material 
consequence to the company.66 In contrast with the prima facie test,67 the threshold of proof 
 
57 Maleka F. Cassim The statutory derivative action under the companies Act of 2008, Guidelines for the exercise 
of the judicial discretion. (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) at 31. 
58 M A Maloney ‘Whither the Statutory Derivative Action’ (1986), 64 Can. B. Rev 309 at 326. 
59 Mbethe v United Manganese (Pty) Limited 2017 AII SA at 67. 
60 Mbethe v United Manganese (Pty) Limited 2017 AII SA at 67. 
61 Mbethe v United Manganese (Pty) Limited 2017 AII SA 67 at 20.  
62 M.A. Maloney Whither the Statutory Derivative Action’ (1986), 64 Can. B. Rev 309 at 326 citing Armstrong v 
Gardner (1970). 20 O.R. (2ed) 648 (Ont.H.C). 
63 M. A. Maloney Whither the Statutory Derivative Action’ (1986), 64 Can. B. Rev 309 at 326 citing Armstrong v 
Gardner (1970), 20 O.R. (2ed) 648 (Ont.H.C.). 
64 Companies Act, section 165(5)(b)(iii). 
65 Maleka Femida Cassim The statutory derivative action under the companies Act of 2008, Guidelines for the 
exercise of the judicial discretion. (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) 62 .Dr. Maleka 
explains that section 165 gives power to the courts to act the gate keepers of the derivative action by 
discarding cases without merit thus weeding the good cases from the bad. The test on the trial of a serious 
question examines the merits of the case. Thus litigants must prove their case.   
66 Companies Act, section 165(5)(b)(ii). 
67 Beecham Group Ltd v B-M Group (Pty) Ltd 1977 (1) SA 50 (T). 
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for the trial of a serious question on the merits of the case is relaxed and lower.68 Notably, 
authors have commended the legislature stating that, ‘the modern criterion of the trial of a 
serious question is in keeping with the policy principle that leave applications for derivative 
actions should be relatively simple short and inexpensive.’69 
The litigant must, in addition, prove that the question to be tried is of material consequence to 
the company.70 Clearly, this is a safeguard against the pursuit of bona fide claims whose 
benefits will not justify the cost of instituting or defending such claims. The courts will uphold 
the presumption that the directors acted in the best interests of the company by not pursuing a 
claim whose benefits would be inconsequential to the company.71 
 
2.4.3 The test for the best interests of the company 
Finally, the litigant must satisfy the court that it would be in the best interests of the company 
to initiate the derivative claim.72 When the directors of a company refuse to commence or 
continue with the legal process, a rebuttable presumption arises that the directors’ decision 
against prosecuting the matter was made in the best interests of the company.73  
Companies are in the business of generating revenue, therefore, any time or resources that are 
diverted from that cause may, in my view, be considered as acts that are not in the best interests 
of the company.74 The best interests of the company relate to business decisions that favour the 
interests of the current and future shareholders of the company.75 The test for the best interest 
of the company looks at the commercial viability of the claim instead of the legal viability.76 
 
68 Cassim supra, note 67 at 59 commends this change by the law makers stating the lower threshold eliminates 
the risk of the courts prematurely conducting a trial of the merits at the stage of application for leave to bring 
the case.  
69 Maleka Femida Cassim The statutory derivative action under the companies Act of 2008, Guidelines for the 
exercise of the judicial discretion. (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) 62. 
70 Cassim supra, note 62 at 57. 
71 Section 165(7) read together with section 76 of the Act which codifies the business judgment rule. The 
justification for this presumption is aptly described by Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in 
South Africa (2011) 16 stating that the Companies Act as a whole tries to limit over-regulation by ensuring that 
it is the board of directors who run the companies and not regulators and judges.  
72 Companies Act, section 165(5)(b)(iii). 
73 Companies Act, section 165(7). 
74 The best interests’ criteria validate the commercial and business reasons for companies declining to pursue 
derivative claims because the time and resources could be more beneficially used elsewhere. Cassim supra, note 
62 at 83-4. 
75 Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health 1970 (2) All ER 362. See also Contemporary Company Law  
at 514-516.  
76 Maleka F Cassim The statutory derivative action under the Companies Act of 2008: Guidelines for the exercise 
of the judicial discretion (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) at 73 
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One author notes that whilst the primary concern is the commercial viability, the strength of 
the case and its prospects of success are also considered under this test.77  
Other jurisdictions approach the tests differently. For example, in Canada, the criterion for the 
‘best interests of the corporation’ dwells primarily on the strength of the claim as opposed to 
the commercial viability of the claim.78 In addition, the threshold of proof in Canada is lower 
than the South African and Australian79 standards. Section 239(2) (c) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act,80 only requires that the litigant satisfy the court that the claim ‘appears to be 
in the best interest of the corporation’.81 In Australia, the question is whether or not the litigant 
can establish on a balance of probabilities that the claim is in the best interests of the 
company.82  
Supporting the high threshold for the best interests criterion in South Africa, Cassim argues 
that minority shareholders, when they wish to act on behalf of the company, must be held to 
the same standards as directors and officers of the company.83 They must at all times act in the 
best interests of the company. Thus, the test of the best interests of the company in South 
Africa, similar to the standard in Australia which the courts have stated, ‘must not be an inquiry 
into the possibility or potential’84 of a claim but that the claim ‘must’ be in the best interests of 
the company. Cassim argues that if it can be proved that there is an alternative remedy that will 
provide the same redress and satisfy the notions of justice, then it would not be in the best 
interests of the court to pursue litigation.85 I agree with this reasoning. Litigation should be a 
last resort after the parties have exhausted all other mediums available to them. As mentioned 
in chapter one the company is based on a private contract between shareholders. Therefore, 
where possible, the shareholders must attempt to resolve their disputes without the interference 
of the courts. 
 
77 Cassim supra, note 68 at 73-4. 
78 Maleka F. Cassim The statutory derivative action under the Companies Act of 2008: Guidelines for the exercise 
of the judicial discretion (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) at 74. 
79 Australian Corporation Act section 237(2)(c) ‘it is in the best interests of the company that the litigant be 
granted leave…’ It appears that the South African criterion of the best interests of the company was modelled 
after the South African Act.  
80 Canada Business Corporations Act R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44. 
81 Canadian Business Corporations Act, section 293 (2)(c).  
82 Swansson v R A Pratt Properties Ltd 2002 (42) ACSR at 313. 
83 Cassim supra, note 80 at 74. See also Companies Act, section 76(3) which requires directors to act in good 
faith, for a proper purpose, in the best interests of the company with a degree of care, diligence and skill in the 
exercise of their duties.  
84 Carpenter v Pioneer park Pty Limited (in Liq) 2004 NSWSC 1007 at 19. 
85 Maleka Cassim The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act (2016) at 84-5. 
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Although it has been explained that the best interests test is about the commercial viability of 
a claim, it should not be interpreted, ‘to be a purely “cost-benefit” analysis.’86 Hence, even 
though the monetary value may be inconsequential, the value of deterring future misconduct 
might prove more important. It has been argued that not only would it be difficult to assess the 
costs and benefit accurately but the derivative action has more than one purpose. Whilst it is 
suitable for compensating the company for losses it must be used as a deterrence mechanism.87 
Others have argued that ‘the derivative action should serve as the principal means by which to 
enforce the fiduciary duties of corporate officials and to penalise the violation thereof.’88 
Accordingly, the court must balance the two purposes of compensating the company and 
deterring the behaviour complained of. The court must not always dismiss an application 
because the damage is nominal, at the same time some amounts may be too nominal to warrant 
the involvement of the courts. This paper suggests that in such cases alternative dispute 
resolution methods must be allowed particularly where they offer cheaper, faster and flexible 
means of reaching a solution. The courts should be given the discretion to consider other 
remedies that would achieve justice in a less expensive manner. For example, the list of orders 
the court can grant when a litigant applies for leave can include the court’s ability to direct the 
matter for mediation.  
Section 166(1) of the South African Companies Act act allows the use of alternative dispute 
resolution, for example, arbitration, mediation or conciliation instead of the formal courts.  It 
is submitted that this is important for the preservation of business relationships, an element that 
would be absent if parties pursue the formal court procedures.89 Litigation is adversarial in 
nature and matters before the courts go on public record. With arbitration for example, the 
matters are closed to the public.  However, alternative dispute resolution, whilst more flexible 
and less procedural, may not always be cheaper than formal courts.90 For instance the calling 
of industry experts and other administrative fees may exponentially increase the costs of 
alternative dispute resolution.  
 
86 Cassim supra, note 70 at 84. 
87 Cassim supra, note 70 at 84-5. 
88 John C. Coffee Jr & Donald E. Schwartz ‘The choice of rationales: Deterrence Versus Compensation’ in ‘The 
Survival of the derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia law 
Review 261 at 302. 
89 Steven C. Nelson ‘Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes’ (1989) Volume 1 The International 
Lawyer pp 187-206 at 188. 




2.5 The issue of costs, checks and balances  
The system in South Africa provides for a three-pronged approach that tests the merit of the 
case before the court can allow the litigant to proceed on behalf of the company. Once it is 
established that the applicant’s case has some merit of consequential benefit to the company, 
such a litigant should not be impeded by the fear of incurring high litigation costs. It is not in 
the interests of justice to require the litigant to provide security for costs in derivative actions 
when, in contrast, such a litigant stands to gain no direct benefit should the case succeed. It is 
reasonably foreseeable that applicants will be hesitant to cede personal assets without the 
assurance of a successful outcome. Requiring the litigant to provide security appears to punish 
persons willing to pursue justice.91 It, therefore, discourages shareholder awareness and 
activism. According to section 165(10) and 165(11) of the Companies Act should be amended 
to repeal the requirement of security for costs from a litigant.  
The burden of costs remains one of the greatest impediments to the full use and effectiveness 
of this derivative remedy. The case of Wallersteiner v Moir92 made interesting points which 
South African legislators did not fully appreciate. The Wallersteiner v Moir case considered 
the notion that the company in question should indemnify litigants against costs in the result 
of a loss since the litigant was acting for the company and not himself. 93 The court went further 
and reinforced the principle that, ‘… he who would take the benefit of a venture if it succeeds 
ought also to bear the burden if it fails.’94 The same solution and principle presented in 
Wallersteiner v Moir remain valid to date. It is burdensome to request the litigant with a good 
case to provide personal assets as security for costs yet he or she stands to receive no direct 
benefit should the case succeed. The request for the security of costs would be better suited to 
a litigant with a less than satisfactory case that insists on bringing the suit despite the court and 
company recommendations. The high thresholds required in South Africa provide enough 
safeguards against frivolous and vexatious claims such that the fear of legal costs should not 
 
91 Companies Act, section 165(11) provides that the court may require security for costs from a litigant before 
granting the leave to proceed with the action.  
92 Wallersteiner v Moir 1975 (1) AII ER at 849. 
93 This was an arrangement between a litigant and a financier, usually a lawyer, to finance the litigation in 
exchange for a percentage of the award, if the case was won. This was considered illegal as it was considered as 
a mechanism that encouraged and increased lawsuits. 
94 Wallesteiner v Moir 1975 (1) AII ER 849 at 859. 
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be used as a deterrent mechanism.95 Once a litigant has satisfied the court that they are acting 
in good faith, presenting the trial of a serious question of material consequence to the company 
and in the best interests of the company, they must be indemnified for the legal costs.   
A litigant with an indemnity for costs will neither limit the scope of their investigation into the 
alleged wrong nor the time they will spend with lawyers and other personnel looking into the 
matter. However, an indemnity for costs must not be taken as a licence for a litigant to incur 
exorbitant legal bills. Measures must be put in place so that a litigant will only be entitled to 
reasonable costs. Any unreasonable costs incurred in excess of what is reasonably acceptable 
must be borne by the applicant.  
2.7 A comparison of the derivative action in Zimbabwe  
The newly promulgated Companies and Other Business Entities Act codifies the derivative 
action under section 60.96 This action allows members of the company to sue on a wide basis 
as read together with sections 54 and 55 of the same Act. Similar to the derivative provision in 
South Africa, litigants are required by law to make a demand in writing to the directors of the 
company for the company to sue.97 Only after a period of thirty days after this demand is turned 
down, and all other means have failed, can the applicant approach the courts.98 This is a 
significantly short amount of waiting time in comparison to the sixty days mandated in the 
South African Companies Act.99 However, an applicant’s ability to institute a derivative action 
is dependent on their shareholding.100 The Companies and Other Business Entities Act only 
allows for members representing at least ten percent of the voting power to bring a claim before 
the courts.101 This very different from the South African Companies Act which allows a 
broader class of applicants and odes not place restrictions based on the amount of shareholding. 
Whilst the approach in South Africa requires the applicant to first seek leave from the courts 
to sue, in Zimbabwe the applicant can directly bring an action before the courts. This shortens 
the process significantly, which can lead to the abuse of this provision leading to an influx of 
frivolous and vexations litigation. However, it can be argued that the limitation of the 
availability of this remedy to only those with ten percent or more of the voting power will 
 
95 A discussion above highlights the three tests that a litigant must prove before the courts can grant relief. It is 
submitted that those tests provide a sufficient method to filter the frivolous lawsuits. 
96 Companies and Other Business Entities Act, 2018. 
97 Companies and other business entities section 60 (3) (d).  
98 Supra note 95. 
99 Companies Act, section 165 (4) (b). 
100 Companies and Other Business Entities Act, 2018 section 60(2)(c). 
101 Companies and Other Business Entities Act, 2018 section 60(2)(c). 
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drastically reduce the number of cases before the courts. Unlike the South African Act which 
requires the appointment of an independent investigator to look into the allegation company, 
the Zimbabwean Act places no such obligation on the company.   
Justice Chinhengo in the case of Westerhoff v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation emphasised the 
importance of a litigant furnishing the court with substantial and material information for the 
court to grant the relief that is being requested.102 The Judge emphasised that such information 
has a bearing on whether or not the court grants the order and the failure to do so, willingly or 
negligently might lead to the failure of the action.103 Although the courts recognise the 
importance of information in establishing one’s case, the Companies and Other Business 
Entities Act does not provide for this right to access company information to shareholders. It 
is recommended that the new Act include a right of access to information close for 
shareholders, directors and members of the company as does the South African Act.104  
The Companies and Other Business Entities Act does not provide for the right to resort to 
alternative dispute resolution prior to formal courts. However, section 61(2) of the same Act 
allows the court the discretion to make order referring an applicant to proceed with their 
derivative claim through alternative dispute resolution. This might be possible if the 
memorandum or articles of association provide for this remedy.  
 
Conclusion  
The derivative action in South Africa has fairly been advanced with the abolition of the 
common law derivative action. The provisions of section 165 of the Companies Act clearly 
outline the requirements that shareholders must satisfy before the courts can grant them leave 
to bring a derivateive claim. The South African Companies Act has extended legal standing to 
persons previously unable to bring this claim which extends the application of the remedy to 
wider group of persons. Furthermore, the South African Companies Act provides a right of 
access to information to shareholders enabling them to bring substantiated claims, with better 
prospects of success before the courts. On the other hand, the South African Companies Act 
places heavy procedural requirements on the minorities, which make litigation seem 
burdensome. However, minorities are not restricted to the use of formal courts only but may 
 
102 Westerhoff v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation unreported case no. High Court Harare Case No. 105- 2003 at 
9. 
103 Westerhoff v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation unreported case no. High Court Harare Case No. 105- 2003 at 
11. 
104 Companies Act, section 26. 
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make use of any form of alternative dispute resolution. This is commendable as it addresses 


























Chapter 3: Dissenting Shareholder’s Appraisal in South Africa  
 
3.1 An introduction to dissenting shareholder’s appraisal rights   
Dissenting shareholders’ appraisal rights, hereinafter referred to as appraisal rights, provide 
relief in limited circumstances by allowing minority shareholders to withdraw their investment 
from a company when the company embarks on a direction that is contrary to the minority's 
liking.105 The introduction of appraisal rights to South African Company law was influenced 
by similar provisions from the USA’s legal system which can be traced back to Delaware.106 
South Africa adopted and ratified appraisal rights under the current section 164 of the 
Companies Act. Appraisal rights can be described as a compromise between upholding the 
majority rule and affording minorities the option to opt out when their business interests are no 
longer aligned with those of the majority.107 Appraisal rights provide relief to minority 
dissenting shareholders facing a buyout by the company allowing them to receive a fair value 
for their shares.108 An important aspect of appraisal rights is the question of the valuation of 
the shares hence the name, appraisal rights.109 This right is available to shareholders in limited 
circumstances110 and, as will be demonstrated below, only if the dissenting shareholders follow 
the procedural requirements strictly. 
Appraisal rights provide a statutory exit mechanism in instances where a resolution of 
fundamental change of the company is proposed and a minority of the shareholders dissent to 
the adoption of such a resolution.111 For instance, when a company contemplates, the alteration 
of preferences rights and limitations of any class of shares, the disposal of assets, a scheme of 
arrangement and or a merger or amalgamation, it triggers the application of the appraisal 
rights.112 Not only do minorities have the right to exit but they do not have to go through the 
trouble of finding a willing buyer for their shares, the company itself is obligated to buy the 
 
105Barry M. Wertheimer ‘The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy and how courts determine fair value’ (1998) 47 
Duke Law Journal at 614-615. 
106 New York Code, Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware General Law. 
107 Cilliers v LA Concorde Holdings Limited & Others 2018 (6) SA 97 (WCC) at 34.  
108 When a minority section of shareholders is opposed and votes against the adoption of a resolution to 
implement a fundamental transaction, section 164 of the Companies Act obliges the company to buy the 
shares of the said minority.  
109 In terms of section 164(14) of the Companies Act, the minority shareholders in this instance can only 
approach the courts with regard to the valuation of the shares subject to the dissent. 
110 Appraisal rights are triggered in three circumstances namely when a company proposes transactions that 
alter the holding of the company, for example, disposal of assets, scheme of arrangement, amalgamation or 
merger and amendment of the memorandum of incorporation altering the preferences, rights or limitations or 
terms of any class of shares. 
111 Cilliers v LA Concorde Holdings Limited & Others 2018 (6) SA 97 (WCC) at 34. 
112 Companies Act, section 164(2).  
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dissenting shareholder’s shares.113 In my view, this is a positive development. It ensures that 
the board of directors will make every effort to engage in transactions that only further the 
interests of the shareholders or that if they are looking for a transaction they will do so in good 
faith and obtain the best deal price for the shares of the company.114 
 
3.2 The justification for appraisal rights 
It has been argued that appraisal rights must be treated as an anomaly in corporate jurisprudence 
and should narrowly be confined and strictly construed.115There are several justifications for 
appraisal rights. First, appraisal rights provide a mechanism ensuring that the majority will not 
disregard the minority’s opinion and transform the enterprise at the expense of the minority.116 
Secondly, because fundamental changes in the enterprise entail more than a disagreement over 
business planning, the minority shareholders could have lost a valuable business opportunity 
causing irreparable harm that cannot be compensated by an opportunity elsewhere.117 Finally, 
appraisal rights advance the ideals of fairness in the corporation through permitting a 
shareholder to opt out of a transaction that he or she thinks is ill-considered or unfair and having 
a ready buyer for their shares.118 Shareholders are protected from being drawn, involuntarily 
into a drastically different enterprise in which they have no confidence in.119 In essence, 
appraisal rights involve a delicate attempt at balancing the interests of the majority and minority 
owners. In summation, ‘majority owners should not be chained to what they believe to be an 
unsound business judgment; yet, neither should the minority owners be bound to remain 
shareholders when they have similar misgivings.120  
 
 
113 Companies Act, section 164(5) entitles dissenting shareholders to place a demand on the company to 
purchase the dissenting shares.  
114 Jaqueline Yeats ‘The Proper and Effective exercise of Appraisal Rights under the South African Companies Act, 
2008: Developing a Strategic Approach Through a Study of Comparable Law’ (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy 
thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015) at 161. 
115 Joseph E. Magnet ‘Shareholder’s appraisal rights in Canada’ (1979) 11 Ottawa Law Review at 102. 
116 Magnet supra, note 122 at 103. 
117 Magnet supra, note 122 citing Rams, ‘Judicial valuation of dissenting shareholder interests’ (1973) 8 LINCOLN 
L Rev 74, at 88. 
118 Companies Act, section 164(2) read together with subsection (3). 
119 Magnet supra, note 122 citing Eisenberg, ‘The Legal Roles of shareholders and management in modern 
corporate decision-making’ 1969 57 CALIF. L. Rev. 1, at 80. 




3.3 Explaining the trigger mechanisms for appraisal rights  
As alluded to earlier, appraisal rights are only available to shareholders in limited corporate 
transactions.121 In South Africa, these are termed fundamental transactions. Fundamental 
transactions often entail a change in business, a change in ownership or change in the rights of 
shareholders.122A fundamental transaction occurs when a company is contemplating a merger 
or amalgamation,123  the disposal of assets,124 a scheme of arrangement125 or the alteration of 
the preferences, rights or limitations of any class of its shares.126It is reasonably conceivable 
that not all shareholders will consent to the proposal and are thus unwilling to continue with 
their investment in a business that no-longer serves their interest. At the same time, their dissent 
or disapproval of the proposal does not mean the proposal will be abandoned. When the 
dissenting shareholders only constitute a minority, steps to implement the transaction will be 
implemented, triggering the mandatory step requiring the company to buy back its shares from 
the minority at a fair price. Henochsberg critics the qualification in section 164(2)(a) that the 
amendment to the Memorandum of Incorporation must be “materially adverse to the rights or 
interests as wide and vague”.127 The commentators argue that without providing the basis of 
“rights and interests”, the provision in section 164 can be read to mean other rights and interests 
outside of the Memorandum of Incorporation. This would result in a wider application of the 
remedy than the legislators originally intended. Furthermore, section 37(8) gives the remedy if 
there is an amendment that will materially and adversely alter the preferences, rights, 
limitations and other terms of a class of shares. The requirement that the alteration must 
materially and adversely alter is very different from the requirement to materially adversely 
alter as prescribed in section 164 thus creating an inconsistency in the law.  
 
121 Companies Act, section 164(2). 
122 All the fundamental transactions involve the selling of or merging of business interests which affects the 
ownership and management of the business. The amendment of the MOI can result in the change of rights of 
shareholders; thus, it is important that shareholders should be allowed to exit the company when the change 
contemplated is opposite what they contracted to. 
123 This is defined by section 1 of the Companies Act as a transaction or series thereof between two or more 
companies that results in one of the companies being absorbed by the other and taking on the identity of the 
remaining company or the absorption of the companies under a new company. 
124 This is understood to mean the sale of fifty percent or more of a company’ assets or shares of the company 
as stipulated in section 112 of the Companies Act. 
125 This is a proposal by the board of directors of an arrangement between the company and its shareholders 
relating to any class of securities as stipulated in section 114 of the Companies Act.  
126 Section 164(2)(a) means that appraisal rights will only apply in cases where the amendment of the MOI is in 
relation to altering preference rights, or any action that would adversely affect the rights and interests of the 
holders of such shares.  
127 Piet Delport on Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) at 577. 
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3.4 Outlining the procedure for asserting appraisal rights in South Africa 
When a notice of a special meeting is sent out to the shareholders, it must contain the resolution 
to be voted on as well as an advisory notice of the shareholders’ rights of appraisal of their 
shares.128 The Companies Act does not provide sufficient detail as to the extent of the 
company’s obligation in ensuring that the shareholders fully understand their appraisal rights 
and how to enforce them. This leaves the provision open to the interpretation of directors who 
may elect to merely provide a summary of the provisions of section 164 of the Companies Act.  
It must be understood that the intention of the legislator was to ensure that the company not 
only performs its due diligence but also that it protects the minority shareholder by informing 
them of their rights. This applies even in circumstances in which the interests of the company 
do not coincide with the interests of the minority shareholders. The Canadian Business 
Corporations Act is similar and instructs that notices of fundamental transactions must also 
contain notices advising shareholders of their appraisal rights.129 However, in Canada, the 
failure to advise shareholders on these rights does not invalidate the adoption of resolutions 
voted on.130  
On receipt of the notice, a shareholder intending to dissent and exercise his or her appraisal 
rights must send a notice of this intention to the company ahead of the meeting.131 The 
dissenting shareholders are required to vote against the resolution.132  Section 164 (5) is only 
available to the dissenting shareholders on condition that they complied with the requirements 
to serve notice and vote against the resolution.133 There is no flexibility to this rule with regard 
to allowing shareholders who failed to serve a notice of the intention to vote against the 
resolution to actually cast a vote on the day. 
Once the resolution has been adopted the company must, within ten business days, notify all 
dissenting shareholders of the adoption of the resolution voted on.134 This triggers the 
shareholder’s duty to make a demand for payment or alternatively withdraw their dissent.135 A 
shareholder cannot dissent on a portion of the shares but on all of them.136 This is similar to 
 
128 Companies Act, section 164(2)(b). 
129 Canadian Business Corporation Act, sections 189(3), 188 (3)(2)(b), 189(4)(b) & 175(2). 
130 Canadian Business Corporations Act, sections 189(3), 188(3)(2)(b), 189(4)(b) & 175(2). 
131 Companies, section 164(3). 
132 Companies Act, section 164(5)(c)(i). 
133 Companies Act, section 164(5)(a) & (c). 
134 Companies Act, section 164(4). 
135 Companies Act, section 164(4). 
136 Companies Act, section 164(5). 
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the Canadian position.137 This requirement works as a guard against shareholders who are not 
opposed to the resolution, in principle but are unwilling to take the full risk, therefore, they 
split their shares to mitigate the risk.  
In making a demand for payment, the shareholder must satisfy the company that they, provided 
the notice of intention to dissent, voted against the adoption of the resolution, that the company 
has adopted the resolution voted on and that the shareholder has satisfied all procedural 
requirements.138 Following this, the shareholder must issue a written demand for payment to 
the company and provide a copy to the ‘Takeover Regulation Panel’139 and make arrangements 
to surrender the share certificates to the company.140 
 
3.5 An analysis of the appraisal rights procedure in South Africa 
Access to appraisal rights in South Africa hinges on the shareholder’s ability to strictly adhere 
to the procedural requirements as per the Companies Act.141 Failure to submit a notice or to 
make a demand within the stipulated time periods will result in the shareholder forfeiting their 
right.142  A shareholder is absolved from the obligation to send a notice of objection only if the 
company did not send a notice of the meeting in the first instance.143 The Companies Act places 
a greater burden on the shareholders than it does on the company. A possible explanation is the 
fact that it is important for the purposes of commercial strategy and planning for the directors 
to know how many shareholders will dissent to a proposal.144 In terms of the Model Business 
Corporation Act 2016 (MBCA), if the company does not respond or commence an action for 
the courts to determine the fair value within a stipulated time period, the MBCA requires the 
 
137 Canadian Business Corporation Act, section 190 (4). Procedure as discussed above at para 3.4. 
138 Companies Act, section 164(5)(a), (b), (c)(i)(ii). 
139 This is an organ established in terms of section 196 of the Companies Act with a broad range of functions. 
The panel regulates fundamental transactions within corporations and ensures the protection of minority 
shareholders. 
140 Companies Act, section 164(8) requires the shareholder to deliver copies of the demand of payment for fair 
valuation to the Takeover Regulation panel with details of the shareholder’s name and address, the number of 
shares in respect of which the shareholder seeks payment and the demand for payment of the fair value of those 
shares.  
141 Companies Act, section 164(5) states that a shareholder can only make a demand for payment if the 
shareholder gave the company notice of objection, the shareholder voted against the resolution and followed 
all of the procedural requirements. 
142 Companies Act, section 164(7) the shareholder must make a demand on the company within twenty days of 
receiving a notice from the company on the adoption of the resolution or within twenty days of learning of the 
adoption of the resolution. 
143 Companies Act, section 164(6). 
144 Jaqueline Yeats ‘The Proper and Effective exercise of Appraisal Rights under the South African Companies Act, 
2008: Developing a Strategic Approach Through a Study of Comparable Law’ (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy 
thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015) at 161. 
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company to pay the shareholder the demanded price per share.145 This ensures that the company 
will act swiftly to the demands of the shareholders and the procedural burden is shared equally. 
It is recommended for South Africa to consider adopting such a provision to ensure that 
companies have an incentive to adhere to the procedure, particularly the timelines.  
If a shareholder accepts an offer from the company, all their rights in relation to the shares 
subject to the appraisal are immediately suspended.146The Companies Act does not provide for 
compensation to the shareholder for the loss of opportunity during the time between the 
demand for payment and receipt of payment. Due to the inability to access their capital, pending 
the outcome of the litigation, the minority may miss out on other investment opportunities. 
Although the court has the discretion to consider all relevant facts in determining the fair value 
and on whether to grant an order of interest or not the concept of lost opportunities may not be 
considered.147 
Although the entire procedure is strict, it is accepted that procedures exist as a management 
tool to avoid frivolous suits. For example, minority shareholders can decline a fair offer on 
their shares and engage on a meritless suit in a bid to stall the implementation of the deal.148 
Nevertheless, there must be an equitable balance to ensure that the procedure does not 
inadvertently become a barrier to applicants seeking help. 
Any rigid procedure that cannot be deviated from must have a justification, a principle or 
interest that it seeks to protect. The notice of intention to dissent in the company’s planning 
and forecasting is an important feature.149 Before voting on the contemplated transaction, the 
directors must have, based on responses received from notices, a clear picture of the support 
they have for the transaction and the number of shareholders opposing it.150 This will assist in 
planning the financial requirements towards paying dissenting shareholders, negotiating better 
terms of the deal and it could be an indicator of whether or not the company needs to withdraw 
 
145 Model Business Corporations Act, section 13.30 (a). 
146 Companies Act, section 164(9). 
147 Companies Act, section 164(15)(c)(iii)(bb). 
148 Yeats supra, note 157 at 161 J. Yeats states that the view of the corporate leadership is that the appraisal 
rights do not protect corporation from demands motivated by the hope of a nuisance settlement or fanciful 
conceptions of value.  
149 Jacqueline Yeats ‘The Proper and Effective exercise of Appraisal Rights under the South African Companies 
Act, 2008: Developing a Strategic Approach Through a Study of Comparable Law’ (unpublished Doctor of 
Philosophy thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015) at 162. The company has no way of determining how many 
shareholders will dissent to a fundamental transaction. That results in the company’s inability to plan ahead. 
The requirement of the notices is the first chance the company gets of understanding how receptive the 
shareholders are of the appraisal.  
150 Yeats supra, note 162 at 162.   
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from the transaction.151 Inability to know how many shareholders will dissent can possibly 
destabilise the implementation of the proposed transaction.152 A new practice that has emerged 
is that lawyers advise their corporate clients to incorporate clauses that will allow them to 
withdraw from a contract should the number of dissenting shareholders exceed projections.153  
Although the court’s involvement is minimum154 in my view the procedure between the 
company and the shareholders outside of the courts can be made more flexible. For example, 
the legislature may allow dissenting shareholders grace periods to file late process. This will 
allow dissenting shareholders who lack the legal training to make an informed decision and to 
decisively act. However, the grace or condonation periods must be strict to ensure that they are 
not prone to abuse or used as a tactic to prevent the implementation of the proposed transaction. 
This can be achieved by limiting the grounds on which late filing of documents may be 
condoned.  
 
3.6 The approach to determining ‘fair valuation’ of dissenting shares 
Once the proposed transaction has been adopted, the dissenting shareholders must make a 
demand on the company to be paid the fair value of their shares.155 The Companies Act does 
not define what fair valuation is nor does it place a mandate on the company to reveal to the 
dissenting minority the calculation method that was employed to arrive at a given value. If the 
shareholders disagree with the valuation of their shares, they can approach the courts for a 
determination in terms of section 164(14) of the Companies Act. 
It is interesting to note that there is no fixed method of determination. However, the courts can 
enlist the assistance of appraisers who are normally experts in the field to arrive at what would 
be considered a fair price for the shares.156 The appointment of the expert is done at the 
discretion of the court and without consulting the parties affected.157 The question of which 
method to apply or what factors are considered in arriving at a fair valuation is not settled. It 
 
151 Yeats supra, note 162 at 162.   
152 The case of Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Limited & Others v Sovereign Food Investments Limited & Others 2016 
AII (SA) at 15 is a case example of where a fundamental transaction had to be abandoned because the number 
of dissenting shareholders exceeded the board’s expectations.  
153 Yeats supra, note 162 at 167. 
154 The court is only involved at the end of the process for the determination of the fair, provided that the parties 
are not in agreement. The company or the shareholder only rely on the courts after failing to reach a mutual 
agreement on the valuation of the shares.  
155 Companies Act, section 164(5), (7) & (8). 
156 Companies Act, section 164(15)(c)(iii)(aa). 
157 Section 164(15)(iii). 
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has been maintained that although the question of fair valuation has been determined in dealing 
with oppression remedy the same cannot be applied to appraisal rights.158 This is because under 
the oppression remedy the courts will be dealing with a willing buyer whilst in appraisal rights, 
the buyer is an unwilling one.159It is difficult to impress upon the provision of a list of 
calculation methods or factors because each case is different. The value of the shares is 
determined as at the date on which, and the time immediately before the company adopted the 
resolution that gave rise to the appraisal rights. However, that does not mean the company or 
the courts will take into account the effect of the resolution. Henochsberg declares that the 
effect (positive or negative) of the event that triggered the appraisal rights is not considered in 
the calculation of fair value because the dissenting shareholders did not approve it.160 It is left 
to the courts and the expert to calculate the value of the shares based on the surrounding factors. 
The onus therefore is on each party to convincingly argue which factors must and must not be 
considered or which method is appropriate.  
Once a price has been determined, the courts may make an order of interest at a reasonable rate 
to be calculated from the date the resolution became effective to the date of full and final 
payment.161 Courts are lenient to allow companies who would risk falling to insolvency if 
called upon to make all appraisal payments at once to instead enter into payment plans.162 This 
will guarantee the continuity of the business at the same time enable the company to meet its 
obligations. The solvency and liquidity163 of the company is a consideration the courts must 
consider in determining the fair value.164  
 
3.7 The burden of the costs of suit  
The Companies Act provides that the court, ‘may make an appropriate order of costs, having 
regard to any offer made by the company and the final determination of the fair value by the 
 
158 Jaqueline Yeats The Proper and Effective exercise of Appraisal Rights Under the South African Companies Act, 
2008: Developing a strategic approach through a study of comparable law (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy 
thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015) at 170. 
159 Contemporary Company Law at 809. 
160 Piet Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) at 577. 
161 Companies Act, section 15(c)(iii)(bb). 
162 Companies Act, section 17 (a) & (b) (ii). Furthermore, the court may allow the company to pay the due amount 
in instalments should the company prove that a once off payment will hinder it from its commitment to other 
obligations. This is not a disregard of the shareholders’ right to their capital investment but a means of ensuring 
that the company remains solvent. This can be applicable where there is large number of dissenting rights. 
163 Companies Act, section 4(1) states the company would have established its solvency and liquidity if it can 
prove to the court that its assets exceeds its liabilities and that it will be able to pay its debts as they become 
due and payable within a period of 12 months from the date the test is considered. 
164 Companies Act, section 17(b)(i). 
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court.’165 The results will be that if the court determines the fair value to be considerably higher 
than the offer of the company, the court may award costs in favour of the shareholder and the 
opposite applies.166 In terms of the MBCA, the company will bear the burden of court costs167 
for both parties (different from legal costs) together with the company’s legal costs and may 
depending on the court, have to pay the shareholders’ legal costs.168 This approach will lessen 
the burden on the shareholders who only have to pay for their lawyers. However, appraisal 
litigation can be complex and require teams of legal experts in the relevant field and this may 
not be practical for an individual shareholder. This could leave dissenting shareholders with no 
option but to abandon any aspirations to pursue their rights, even if they have a rightful claim. 
Thus, whilst the remedy is available, the cost of exercising the right may ultimately render it 
unattainable for some minority shareholders. Minorities may elect to pursue any of the three 
forms of arbitration  
 
3.8 Zimbabwe and the introduction of appraisal rights  
The newly promulgated Companies and Other Entities Act provides for dissenting 
shareholders’ appraisal rights.169 The appraisal rights will be applicable in similar 
circumstances to the South African Companies Act instances namely, a variation of rights 
attached to any shares170 mergers and amalgamations171 and major asset transactions.172  
Section 95(8) of the Zimbabwean Companies and Other Business Entities Act separately makes 
provision for the application of appraisal rights. This section is strikingly similar to the South 
African provision under section 37(8) of the Companies Act. Whilst the above mentioned 
clauses are similar word for word, the same cannot be said for parallel provisions namely 
section 232 of the Zimbabwean Companies and Other Business Entities Act and and section 
164 of the South African Companies Act. For example, the application of appraisal rights in 
 
165 Companies Act, section 164(15)(iv). 
166 Jaqueline Yeats The Proper and Effective exercise of Appraisal Rights Under the South African Companies Act, 
2008: Developing a strategic approach through a study of comparable law (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy 
thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015) at 204. 
167 These are defined as expenses charged in a law suit as determined by the courts. Whereas legal costs relate 
to the parties’ cost in hiring attorneys and expert witnesses. 
168 Model Business Corporation Act, section 13.31(a). 
169 Companies and Other Business Entities Act, 2018 section 232. 
170 Companies and Other Business Entities Act, 2018 section 141(1). 
171 Means the merging of one or more existing companies into another existing company as defined by section 
225 of the Companies and Other Businesses Entities Act. 
172 Means a transaction or related series of transactions involving the purchase, sale, transfer, pledge or 
mortgage outside the usual course of the company’s business as defined by section 225 of the Companies and 
Other Business Entities Act, 2018 section. 
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relation to the amendment of the memorandum or articles has a narrow application. The 
Zimbabwean provision in section 232 of the Companies and Other Business Entities Act does 
not qualify that there be a “materially adverse” effect on the rights and interests of the 
shareholders in order for the variation to trigger appraisal rights.   
The procedural formalities required of dissenting shareholders in Zimbabwe are also very 
similar to its South African counterpart. The clause also provides for litigation in the event that 
the shareholders and the company are unable to come to an agreement on what is the fair value 
of the shares.173 The courts are given latitude and will have the discretion to consider various 
factors in determining the fair value. Having a strict formula can be difficult if there are 
unforeseen circumstances that arise and contribute to the determination of fair value.  
Conclusion 
Appraisal rights are an important part of protecting dissenting minorities by guaranteeing them 
the protection of their rights and when that is threatened to change, they are allowed to exist 
the business. By mandating the company to purchase the dissenting shares at a fair value, both 
the South African Companies Act and the Zimbabwean Companies and Other Business Entities 
Acts protect minorities who would otherwise have no negotiating leverage if they were to seek 
their own buyers. Both Acts mentioned above also balance the need for the company to plan 
ahead by placing heavy procedural burdens on the minorities together with penalties for failure 
to adhere to these procedures. However, the company does not face similar penalties and this 
produces an imbalance in the provision. It is recommended that this must be rectified by placing 
similar penalties on the company to incentivise the company to adhere to the procedural 
requirements. The involvement of the courts is kept to a minimum by only invoking their 













Chapter 4: The evolution of the oppression remedy in South Africa  
 
4.1 A discussion of the oppression remedy  
The cardinal rule in company law is that the management of the business and affairs of a 
company is under the direction of the board of directors which has full authority.174 The 
shareholders surrender the management of the company to the directors who are duty bound to 
act diligently and in the best interests of the company.175The courts have famously upheld that 
the directors are best positioned to fulfil their mandate and the courts try to refrain from 
questioning the wisdom of the directors’ decisions.176The courts precisely explained this point 
in the case of Louw v Nel at 678 G-H stating minority shareholders, in terms of the contract 
they signed are bound by the decisions of the majority, even where such decisions adversely 
affect the minority, for as long as such corporate decisions are arrived at in accordance with 
the law. The supremacy of the majority is essential to the proper functioning of companies.177  
However, the authority of the board does not go unchecked. The law provides a checks and 
balance mechanism to prevent the abuse of the authority given to directors in section 66 of the 
South African Companies Act mentioned above. A remedy is available to shareholders and 
directors who complain of, have been or continue to face oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
conduct178 from majority shareholders and other members of the company.179This remedy is 
known as the oppression remedy as provided for by section 163 of the Companies Act.  In 
South Africa, the oppression remedy is available to two specific groups of persons namely, 
 
174 Companies Act, section 66(1). 
175 Section 76 of the Companies Act places several obligations on directors to name a few, the duty to act in the 
best interests of the company, the duty to exercise a degree of care, skill, and diligence, the duty to act in good 
faith and for a proper purpose in carrying out their functions. 
176 Maleka F Cassim The statutory derivative action under the Companies Act of 2008: Guidelines for the exercise 
of the judicial discretion (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) at 73. 
Although this concept was explained in the context of the derivative action it bears the same meaning in this 
case. 
177 Louw & Others v Nel 2011 (2) AII SA at 172 (SCA) at 22 citing Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 
1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 678 G-H. 
178 Although the Companies Act does not provide a definition, this is understood to mean a variety of action that 
entail the abuse of one’s power and duty to the detriment of others. The terms will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
179 Companies Act, section 163.  
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shareholders and directors.180 However, in other jurisdictions, such as Canada, there is no 
restriction as to who can approach the courts for relief from oppressive conduct.181 
The nature of the oppression remedy is to provide relief to shareholders or directors who are 
subjected to oppressive or prejudicial conduct or the abuse of the separate legal personality of 
the company.182 The remedy is distinguished from the derivative action because the litigants 
approach the courts in their personal capacity and not on behalf of the company although the 
company as a whole might benefit from the suit. Aggrieved shareholders can bring before the 
court’s complaints of practices, decisions and any other conduct of persons that has had an 
unfairly negative impact on their interests.183 
4.2 A look at the legal standing for the remedy 
Section 163(1) of the Companies Act provides that a shareholder or director may approach the 
court for relief from conduct that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or the abuse of separate 
juristic personality of the company that has an unfairly negative impact on their interests. 
Cassim highlights that the expansion of the legal standing to include directors therefore means 
the oppression remedy now applies to quasi-partnerships which historically brought the highest 
cases of oppression allegations.184 Related persons can now sue under the oppression remedy, 
this means shareholders or directors of holding or subsidiary companies may also complain 
about the conduct of affairs of a subsidiary or holding company respectively.185 Whilst the 
extension of legal standing to include directors and shareholders is an improvement from the 
old (1973) Companies Act, in comparison to other jurisdictions, South Africa can further 
improve.  In contrast, Australia186 and Canada187 provide an extensive list of persons who can 
 
180 Companies Act, section 163(1). 
181 Canada Business Corporations Act section 241 (1). 
182 Section 163(2) of the Companies Act provides a lengthy and open-ended list of remedies available to 
shareholders. Such remedies range from compensatory orders, ordering issues of contention to trial, appointing 
directors amongst other remedies. These will be more fully discussed in later chapters.   
183 Although the Companies Act does not define the term interests, case law has defined to mean more than a 
shareholders' legal rights and extends to relations of the company with third parties. 
184 Contemporary Company Law at 760. 
185 Supra note 177. See also Contemporary Company Law at 767. 
186 Australia Corporation Act of 2001, section 234 of the Act stipulates that the remedy is available to the 
following class of persons; persons to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by operation 
of law or persons whom the Australian Securities and Investments Commission thinks appropriate, former 
members of the company and those removed from the register of members.  
187 The Canada Business Corporations Act (hereafter referred to as the CBCA), section 238 defines a litigant as, 
a registered holder, beneficial owner and a former registered holder or beneficial owner of a security of a 
corporation and its affiliates. A director or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or any of its 
affiliates the director or any other persons who in the discretion of the court, is a proper person to make an 
application under the said provision.  
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apply to the courts for relief under the oppression remedy. In addition, the courts in Australia 
and Canada have the discretion to grant legal standing to any person the courts deem as ‘proper’ 
person to make the application.188 This ensures that the courts can protect, employees, investors 
and other stakeholders who may have interests in a company. The availability of the oppression 
remedy to more litigants is commendable because it recognises that, there other stakeholders 
with interests in how the company is managed who can be protected by the oppression remedy. 
 
4.6 Discussion of factors qualifying for the oppression remedy   
 
The result of conduct  
In terms of the Act, The conduct complained of must be completed and manifest a result that 
is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests of the shareholders.189 
The courts have emphasised that it is the result and not the act that must be oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial.190 The effect of this that shareholders are precluded from approaching the 
courts for relief for an anticipated wrong. For example, the board may call for a vote on a 
proposal that will adversely affect the interests of minorities and unfairly so. In terms of the 
current provisions, the minorities cannot approach the courts to prevent this from happening 
but must await the implementation and effect of the said proposal. However, shareholders 
should be allowed to approach the court for an order preventing the act.191 
 
4.6.1 Towards the definition of oppressive conduct 
Although the Companies Act has shied away from providing a definition of oppressive 
conduct, case law has attempted to provide clarity on what qualifies as oppressive conduct. 
There is a wide spectrum or field in which oppressive conduct may fall. Courts have defined it 
as conduct that is any of the following; burdensome, harsh and wrongful, a clear departure from 
the standards of fair dealing and abuse of power which results in a lack of confidence in the 
manner in which the affairs of the company are being conducted.192  South African courts have 
defined oppressive conduct as conduct that is unjust, harsh or tyrannical.193 In other instances, 
 
188 The Australian Corporations Act 2001, section 234(e) and the Canada Business Corporations Act, section 
238(d). 
189 Companies Act, section 163(1)(a). 
190 Cassim supra, note 199. 
191Contemporary Company Law at 765. 
192 Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer 1958 (3) AII E.R. 66. 
193 Grancy Property Limited v Manala & Others 2013 (3) AII SA 111 (SCA).   
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it is described as conduct that lacks probity or fair dealing or that is a visible departure from 
the standards of fair dealing.194 Conduct that violates the conditions of fair play on which every 
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely on has also been held to 
be oppressive conduct.195 As mentioned above, there is a wide spectrum of definitions and the 
courts have also acknowledged that these definitions are widely divergent.196 This is to say that 
the definitions of oppression are on either end of the spectrum. Conduct that is tyrannical is 
different from conduct that consists of a violation of the conditions of fair play.197 Due to the 
different definitions of the word oppressive, it has become difficult to easily identify the 
accurate meaning of the word. The lack of a precise meaning of the word leads to difficulty in 
assessing what can be classified as oppressive conduct. The court answered this question in the 
case of Aspek Pipe v Maurerberger stating that a litigant should not have to go to the lengths 
of establishing the conduct of a tyrannical nature before they are entitled to relief under section 
163.198 In essence, the term oppressive conduct can be construed to mean all of the mentioned 
types of conduct, but the litigant will not be required to establish tyrannical actions to obtain 
relief as that is a higher form of oppression.  
 
4.6.2. Towards the definition of unfairly prejudicial, unfairly disregards interests 
If the conduct complained of does not amount to oppressive conduct, litigants may still sue for 
conduct that is unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregards their interests.199 However, not 
all conduct that is prejudicial is unfair.200 The company may make decisions, for example, not 
paying dividends to shareholders which is prejudicial to their interests but may have valid 
justifications for doing so. Therefore, the conduct complained of must be both prejudicial and 
unfairly so to the litigant.201  A successful application must satisfy both of these elements.202 It 
 
194 Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical management (Pty) Limited and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) at 4. 
195 Ferdinand S. Tinio ‘What amounts to “Oppressive” conduct under statute. Authorising Dissolution of 
Corporation at suit of minority stockholders’, (2016) 56 A.L.R 3D 358. 2. 
196 Grancy Property Limited v Manala & Others 2013 (3) AII SA 111 (SCA). 
197 Grancy Property Limited v Manala & Others 2013 (3) AII SA 111 (SCA). 
198Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) v Maurerberger (1968) (1) (SA) 517 (C) at 525H-526E. 
199 The Companies Act provides that a litigant may sue on either of the three circumstances. The law does not 
mandate that all three circumstances must be alleged in one action. 
200 The Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) at 574 explains that not all corporate decisions 
made will favour all shareholders. Every shareholder who votes against a resolution may consider the 
implementation of that resolution as prejudicial. However, this may not be unfair particularly where all the 
procedures have been observed. The litigant would have to prove the unfairness.  
201 United Kingdom Law Commission Consultation Paper (CP 142) Shareholder Remedies citing Peter Gibson J in 
re Ringtower Holdings plc 1989 (1) BCLC 427. 437. 
202 Edward B. W. Tong ‘A departure from the majority rule: unfair prejudice in the Companies’ Ordinance   
(cap.622) available at http://www.hkiaat.org/e-newsletter/Oct-15/technical_article/PBEIV.pdf citing Re Saul D 
Harrison &Sons plc 1995 (1) BCLC 14, accessed on 28 January 2019. 
39 
 
is not sufficient for the alleged conduct to satisfy only one of these elements.203 ‘Thus not all 
acts which prejudicially affect shareholders or directors, or which disregard their interest, will 
entitle them to relief- it must be shown that the “conduct” is not only prejudicial or disregardful 
but also that it is unfairly so’204  
Courts have also stated that keeping promises and upholding agreements is important in 
maintaining commercial fairness.205Thus, for any investigation into unfair conduct, it would 
be prudent to begin the investigation with a comparison of the alleged conduct vis-a-vis the 
terms of the MOI.206In essence, unfairness refers to conduct that departs from or abuses the 
agreed terms and any conduct that goes against principles of equity.207 The litigant must prove 
that the conduct has damaged or seriously jeopardised the value of his or her interest within 
the company.208 Additionally, they must prove that the same conduct has caused damage to the 
financial interests of the members such as the devaluation of shares. The conduct complained 
of can manifest in various ways, such as infringement of rights stipulated in the MOI and the 
misappropriation of company funds.209  
The innovative insertion of interests means that an applicant can sue for conduct even when it 
does not violate their rights.210 However, the Companies Act does not provide a definition of 
the ‘interests’. Cassim proposes that in the absence of such definition the courts will have to 
take into account equitable considerations such as shareholders’ legitimate expectations arising 
from collateral agreements.211 In Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd, 
interests were defined as to arise out of fundamental understanding between the shareholders, 
which forms the basis of their association but was not in contractual form.212 
 
 
203 Edward B. W. Tong ‘A departure from the majority rule: unfair prejudice in the Companies’ Ordinance   
(cap.622) available at http://www.hkiaat.org/e-newsletter/Oct-15/technical_article/PBEIV.pdf citing Re Saul D 
Harrison &Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14, accessed on 28 January 2019. 
204 Contemporary Company Law at 771-2. 
205 United Kingdom Law Commission Consultation Paper (CP 142) Shareholder Remedies at 78.   
206 United Kingdom Law Commission Consultation Paper (CP 142) Shareholder Remedies at 78.  
207 Edward B. W. Tong ‘A departure from the majority rule: unfair prejudice in the Companies’ Ordinance   
(cap.622) available at http://www.hkiaat.org/e-newsletter/Oct-15/technical_article/PBEIV.pdf at 3, accessed on 
28 January 2019. 
208 United Kingdom Law Commission Consultation Paper (CP 142) Shareholder Remedies at 81.  
209 Edward B. W. Tong ‘A departure from the majority rule: unfair prejudice in the Companies’ Ordinance   
(cap.622) available at http://www.hkiaat.org/e-newsletter/Oct-15/technical_article/PBEIV.pdf citing Re 
Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959. Accessed on 28 January 2019. 
210 Contemporary Company Law at 770. 
211 Contemporary Company Law at 770. 
212 Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 AII SA 190 GNP at 17.4. 
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4.7 Considering the possible court orders  
Once a court is satisfied that the business of the company has been conducted in an unfairly 
prejudicial or oppressive manner, it is empowered to make a final or interim order as it 
considers fit.213 The wide powers are a welcomed addition as they that ensure the courts have 
room to make decisions that are fair, equitable and appropriate in consideration of all the 
circumstances and the parties in the case. The court has to be able to cure the unfair prejudice 
suffered at the hands of the majority.214 In the case of Lourenco v Ferela, the court stated that 
it is essential for the litigant to formulate the relief that they are seeking,215 but the court is not 
limited by the applicant’s formulation of the relief sought.216 In doing so, it will streamline the 
points of argument, provide clarity and direction to the courts and increases the prospects of 
success for the claim.  However, the lists are not exhaustive and the courts, through the 
discretion granted to them may structure a form of relief that fits the circumstances of the 
particular case at hand.217Although section 163 of the Companies Act does not require the 
litigant to come before it with clean hands, the actions of the minority shareholder leading to 
the dispute in question will be considered. If the fault can be established on the part of the 
litigant, the courts will take that into consideration when granting the relief.218 Therefore the 
conduct of the litigant may have a negative impact on the type of relief the court will grant. 
Needless to say, any relief granted must be commensurate to the conduct subject to the 
complaint. In Louw v Nel, the court emphasised that the nature of the remedy that the court will 
grant will depend upon the conclusion on the degree of oppression but the court must also strive 
to achieve fairness on both sides.219 The court order must be sufficient to solve the problem 
and be feasible to implement. 
The South African list of remedies is extensive,220 much like the Canadian221 and Australian222 
provisions. The oppression remedy provides relief that entails both the minimal as well as 
 
213 Companies Act, section 163 (2) states that, ‘upon considering an application in terms of subsection (1), the 
court may make any interim or final order it considers fit…’ 
214 Louw v Nel 2011 (2) SA 172 (SCA) at 21. 
215 Lourenco v Ferela (Pty) Ltd (No1) 1998 (3) 281 (T) at 295-6. 
216 Heckmair v Beton & Sandstein Industries’ (Pty) Ltd (1) 1980 (1) SA 350. 
217 Companies Act, section 163(2) gives the courts the power to grant any interim or final it may deem fit. This 
means it is left to the court to determine what is best for the parties in the circumstance.   
218 De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd & Others 2017 (3) AII SA 47 at 52. 
219 Louw v Nel 2011 (2) SA 172 (SCA) at 31. 
220 Section 163(2) and Off-Beat Holiday Club & Another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Share Block Ltd & Others 2017 
(7) BCLR 916 at 574. 
221 Canada Business Corporation Act, section 241(3). 
222 Australia Corporations Act 2001 section 233(1). 
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intrusive involvement of the courts trumping the principle of minimal judicial interference in 
the management of the company.223 Some of the remedies shift and change the power structures 
of the company, for example, the appointment of new directors, amendment of the MOI and 
the issuing and exchange of shares.224 Accordingly, courts must guard against oppressing the 
majority with the use of extreme relief measures. Commentators have warned that these wide 
powers conferred upon the courts must be carefully controlled to prevent turning the oppression 
remedy into a source of abuse itself.225  
In conclusion, before a court can grant the relief petitioned by the litigant, the litigant must 
establish the following, that the alleged has been committed, that the conduct or act is unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to them or some part of the members of the company.226 In 
addition, the litigant must prove that the nature of the relief being sought will cure the nature 
of the conduct complained of and that it is just and equitable that the relief is granted. 227 
 
4.8. The oppression remedy in Zimbabwe and the procedure  
Section 222 of the Companies Act restricts the availability of the oppression remedy only to 
members228 of the company. In Zimbabwe, case law has clarified the question of who qualifies 
to use the oppression remedy.229 In the case of Zvandasara v Saungwemwe, the courts made it 
clear that only shareholders and members of the company may apply to the courts for relief 
from oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct.230 It was reinforced that legal standing is only 
available to, shareholders and members and not those acting in some other capacity such as 
that of a director, servant, employee or agent of the company.231 In dismissing the application 
of a director alleging oppression, the court stated that the complaints of a director were an 
employment matter belonging in the labour realm and should be dealt with separately from his 
 
223 Companies Act 71 0f 2008 Section 163(2).  
224 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Section 163(2)(c)(d)(e)(f).  
225 MS Blackman in Commentary on the Companies Act Volume 2 (2002) at 9-4. 
226 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Section 163(2). 
227 Grancy Property v Manala & Others 2013 (3) AII SA 111 (SCA) at 120. 
228 Zimbabwe Companies Act Chapter 24:03. Section 221 defines members for the purposes of section 222 as 
persons who are not members of the company but to whom shares in the company have been transferred or 
transmitted by operation of law.  
229 Zvandasara v Saungweme & Others unreported judgment case no. HH 108 of 2018 at 5. See also, Aspek Pipe 
Co (Pty) Ltd v Mauerberger 1968 (1) SA 517 (C). 
230 Zvandasara v Saungweme & Others unreported judgment case no. HH 108 of 2018 at 5. See also, Aspek Pipe 
Co (Pty) Ltd v Mauerberger 1968 (1) SA 517 (C). 
231  Zvandasara v Saungweme & Others unreported judgment case no. HH 108 of 2018 at 5. See also, Aspek Pipe 
Co (Pty) Ltd v Mauerberger 1968 (1) SA 517 (C).  
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rights as a shareholder.232 However, this reason was flawed. If an employee can establish a 
pattern of behaviour that highlights the intention to oppress them as a shareholder, the courts 
must be open to hearing a case of that nature. This provision is unnecessarily restrictive and 
does not advance the protection of minority shareholders. The unfortunate effect of such 
restrictive application was illustrated in Henochsberg highlighting that, in quasi-partnerships, 
shareholders will take up directorship positions in the company and opt to receive the return 
on their investment as remuneration.233 If the minority shareholders are denied this 
remuneration, the courts must allow them recourse to sue either in their capacity as directors.234 
It is recommended that the legislators should make every attempt to advance rather than restrict 
the functions of this remedy by broadening the list of persons qualifying to, at the very least, 
include directors and other officers of the company as is the case in South Africa.235  
Unlike the South African Companies Act, which requires the result of the conduct as grounds 
or cause of action, the Zimbabwean Companies Act allows applicants to institute action on the 
basis of a proposed action that they deem could have oppressive effect on their interests.236 In 
this regard the Zimbabwean Companies Act opens up this remedy to be both preventative and 
reactionary.  
Regarding the procedural requirements, the litigant must prove that he or she is a shareholder 
or a member of the company, that they are oppressed, that the oppression is at the hands of 
another member of the company and that the oppressive conduct is in relation to the conduct 
to the affairs of the company.237 The details of the complaint must be set out in the application 
documents with specific details of how the affairs of the company are being conducted in a 
manner that is oppressive or prejudicial to them.238 The court will not grant relief that is based 
on generalised averments of said oppressive conduct239, a litigant must allude to specific 
incidents for a specific case. In an effort to maintain its distance from the internal management 
of a company, the courts will only intervene in exceptional circumstances provided for in the 
 
232   Zvandasara v Saungweme & Others unreported judgment case no. HH 11342/14 at 6.   
233 Piet Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011). 
234 Piet Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) at 575. 
235 Companies Act, section 163(1). 
236 Companies and Other Business Entities Act, 2018 section 222. 
237 Zvandasara v Saungweme & Others unreported judgment case no. HH108 of 2018 citing Marshall v Marshall 
(Pty.) Ltd & Others, 1945 (3) SA. 571 (N).  
238 Zvandasara v Saungweme & Others unreported judgment case no HH citing Livanos v Swartzberg & Others 
1962 (4) SA 395 (W.L.D at 397 A-D). 
239  Zvandasara v Saungweme & Others unreported judgment case no. HH 108 of 2018 citing Livanos v 
Swartzberg & Others 1962 (4) SA 395 (W.L.D at 397 A-D).  
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Zimbabwean Companies Act.240 Consequently, the litigant must prove to the court that such 
circumstances are present for the courts to intervene.  
In a similar fashion to the South African Companies Act, the Zimbabwean Companies and 
Business Entities Act, gives wide discretionary powers to the courts to make orders fitting to 
each particular case.241 This is a welcome change from its predecessor Companies Act Chapter 
23:04 which prescribed a limited list of available remedies. Furthermore, section 61 of the 
Companies and Other Business Entities Act provides other orders that the courts are allowed 
to make to relieve applicants. Although the Zimbabwean Companies Act allows for non-
binding alternative dispute resolution,242 the plaintiff cannot use this alternative dispute 
resolution as a first instance. That order can only be granted by the court.243 This undermines 
the purpose of alternative dispute resolution. Once a plaintiff commences action in the formal 
courts, the matter becomes public record, they incur costs and will have to abide by the rules 
and procedures of civil court. The Zimbabwean Companies Act should provide a provision 
similar to section 166 of the South African Companies Act that allows applicants to directly 
pursue alternative dispute resolution without first approaching the courts. 
 
Conclusion 
The oppression remedy covers a wide range of possibilities for minority shareholders. It is also 
evident that the court has been granted wide discretionary powers in deciding what remedy to 
award. These powers must, however, be exercised in advancing the protection of minority 
shareholders, rather than restricting them. It must be understood that the intention of the 
legislature in providing a non-exhaustive relief list was in anticipation of unaccounted for 
events. This would allow a litigant to request an order that fits their circumstance and the 
legislature was correct in not limiting the relief the courts can order because this is dependent 




240   Zvandasara v Saungweme & Others unreported judgment case no HH 108 of 2018 citing Livanos v Swartzberg 
& Others 1962 (4) SA 395 (W.L.D at 397 A-D).  
241 Zimbabwean Companies Act, section 224 (1) 
242 Zimbabwean Companies And Other Business Entities Act, section 61(2)(f). 
243 The Zimbabwean Companies and Other Business Entities Act does not have the quivalent of section 166 of 
the South African Companies Act allowing for alternative dispute resolution methods. Alternative dispute 
resolution is only listed under the list of orders a court can grant as per an applicant’s claim in a dispute.  
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Chapter 5: Findings on the effectiveness of minority protection in South Africa  
 
5.1 Findings of the research 
In comparison with the Zimbabwean legal system, South Africa is fairly advanced in its 
minority shareholder protection provisions and has made commendable advancements towards 
the protection of minority shareholders.244 For example, the derivative action was also 
amended to allow a wider class of persons to make use of the remedy.245 In another example, 
the list of possible relief mechanisms under sections 163of the Companies Act is not exhaustive 
which allows flexibility on the part of the courts to award appropriate relief to applicants.246  
The discussion on dissenting shareholder’s appraisal rights exhibited that it is an instrument 
that affords minorities the opportunity to get a fair deal in the event that they have to sell their 
shares in certain unforeseen circumstances. It allows them to exit a company that no-longer 
serves their financial and business needs. Additionally, it affords them the opportunity not to 
be undermined by the majority shareholders. However, the uncertainty regarding the choice of 
a valuation method(s) that the courts will use muddies the remedy by adding. Therefore, the 
legislature is recommended to establish a compromise that will encourage minorities to 
challenge an unfair valuation. The courts in consultation with leading financial experts may 
come up with a list of non-exhaustive valuation methods that provide guidance to potential 
shareholders and the companies as to what method(s) will be employed or factors will be 
considered to achieve a fair result.  
The derivative action places the minority shareholders in a corporate watchdog position, 
keeping an eye on the conduct of directors. Minority shareholders’ ability to sue on behalf of 
the company provides a deterrent mechanism ensuring the decrease in future misconduct. 
Furthermore, it provides an avenue for the company to be compensated for the loss incurred at 
the hands of errant management. The prospect of facing public humiliation over allegations of 
corporate mismanagement and financial loss that could follow in the form of decreasing stock 
price may be an incentive to persuade the company to settle quickly and privately.  However, 
the benefits of successfully pursuing the derivative accrues to the company but may come at a 
personal cost to the minority shareholders, it is thus probable that they will be hesitant to act. 
Although the courts have discretion in awarding costs, as mentioned above, they also have the 
 
244 The oppression remedy is available to shareholders not only in terms of oppression of rights but also interests. 
This avails the remedy to a broader area to the advantage of minority shareholders.  
245 Companies Act, section 165(2). 
246 Companies Act, section 163(2). 
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discretion to request the shareholder to furnish the courts with security for costs. This 
requirement should be removed from the law because it is unjust to require persons who stand 
to receive no financial gain from the suit to fund it. Once a shareholder has satisfied all the 
requirements as provided for in section 165 of the Companies Act and stands to receive no 
direct benefit, the company should indemnify the shareholder, regardless of the outcome of the 
lawsuit. 
The law ignores the reality that the parties to litigation, particularly in the context of companies 
and minority shareholders, may not be on equal footing. The individual minority shareholder 
may not have the kind of resources to match the company. Inevitably, shareholders are deterred 
from initiating litigation even when they have a valid claim. It is possible that companies can 
use this advantage to threaten minority shareholders to accept unfair offers or to drop their 
claim entirely. Thus, the system is structured unfavourably towards the minority shareholder 
and this must be rectified. Canada, for instance, does not require the security of costs from 
minority shareholders. Once a shareholder establishes that there is a bona fide case, the court 
is obliged to indemnify them against costs. The company must bear such costs. A system of 
that nature will serve to deter any impropriety within companies for fear of heavy legal costs 
burdens. It is recommended for the legislature to consider amending the law to ease the burden 
of the minority shareholders.  
What emerges in every remedy discussed in this paper is that the Companies Act places a heavy 
burden of proof and procedural requirements247on the minority shareholder seeking relief. 
There are procedural formalities with penalties for not adhering to such formalities. This can 
be understood as a necessary measure to guard against the broadness of the remedies. Without 
such limitations, the courts may be flooded with frivolous and ambiguous claims. It is therefore 
important to provide a balance that whilst the procedural requirements guard against abuse of 
the law they also do not deter its utilisation. 
There are other factors exclusive to amending the three shareholder remedies that can be useful 
in ensuring the effectiveness and practicality of minority shareholder protection remedies. 
These factors are discussed below. 
 
 
247 The strict procedural requirements under Companies Act, section 164 and the burden to satisfy the three-
pronged test for an application for leave to sue on behalf of the company under section 165 of the same Act can 
become burdensome for a shareholder and become a deterrent.    
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5.2.1 Considerations of a Specialised Commercial Court  
Throughout the discussion and analysis of the procedures involved with the three remedies, the 
thesis alluded to the problems associated with litigation. Litigation is an adversarial process 
that is loaded with strict procedural requirements. The process of litigation is generally lengthy, 
and attempts must be made to redirect the focus of companies from the courts back to the board 
room. Whilst alternative dispute resolution is one choice, there could also be another. The 
Gauteng province gazetted a circular for the reintroduction of a special commercial court.248 
This court will be dedicated to specific commercial matters. Streamlining the matters that can 
be adjudicated by the courts will result in a smaller caseload for the courts resulting in the 
courts having more time to go through smaller caseloads. As a result, the commercial court 
will be able to hear and dispose of matters at a quicker rate than an ordinary court burdened 
with other matters.  
The special court aims to promote the conduct of litigation and facilitate dispute resolution in 
a quick, cheap fair manner with legal acuity.249 However, the specialised court is not 
completely divorced from the ordinary court process. Litigants will have to in the first instance 
approach the High Court, then seek a referral to the commercial court250 upon satisfying certain 
criteria. Litigants are required to submit a written request to the Judge President justifying the 
need for the matter’s referral to the commercial court.251 The opposing party is allowed to make 
representations in support or against the referral of the matter. Although on the face of it the 
idea of the commercial court is appealing, the process of obtaining the referral itself could turn 
into a mini-trial. In the end, this can prolong the litigation process from the ordinary court to 
the commercial court. The selection of the Judges is handled by the Judge President or Deputy 
President.252 However, the court does not stipulate any peculiar qualifications for Judges to 
qualify for appointment to the commercial court. It is recommended that only judges with 
expertise in handling commercial matters must be appointed to the commercial court. It is 
anticipated that their knowledge and expertise will instil confidence in the litigants themselves 
thus dispensing with the need for expert witnesses. This may in turn reduce the cost of 
litigation.  What will a specialised court do, reduce time, procedure still there, costs still there, 
formality still there, therefore not much difference, serve in time and   
 
248 Commercial Court Practice Directive of 2018 Chapter Chapter1:1.  
249 Commercial Court Practice Directive, Chapter 1:1. 
250 Commercial Court Practice Directive, Chapter 2:1. 
251 Commercial Court Practice Directive, Chapter 2:2. 
252 Commercial Court Practice Directive, Chapter 2:7. 
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Concluding remarks  
This thesis set out to enquire whether three specific minority shareholder provisions were 
effective and practical in affording minorities’ protection of their rights. What is clear is that 
South Africa has, for the most part, made commendable strides towards availing the remedies 
to a wider group of persons and enlarging the scope of the area that the remedies apply to than 
before. This is particularly true of the oppression remedy which despite only being available 
to directors and shareholders has been extended to allow the said persons to not just sue for the 
oppression of their rights but also interests. Appraisal rights are a welcome relief affording 
minorities the option to exit a company, albeit in limited circumstances with the assurance of 
a buyer who is mandated to pay a fair price for the share. The derivative action has been made 
available to a wider class of persons and the courts have been granted the ability to decide 
persons who in their view are legible to bring an action.  
There was comparison with the Zimbabwean legal system and this process highlighted that 
Zimbabwe has much room to improve towards the betterment of minority shareholders. What 
could be observed in both systems are there is a heavy procedural burden on the minority 
shareholders. Whilst the substance of the provisions themselves is sound, the ancillary 
requirements may make the remedies unattainable for most individual shareholders. In 
conclusion, there is always room for the development of the law. The legislature must 
continuously seek to make the law clear and reasonably accessible to those it is intended to 
help.  The conclusion lies in that minority shareholders provisions in the law provide a window 
of opportunity for the protection of minority shareholders. However, there are several factors 
diminishing the effectiveness and practicality of the said measures. The law can be altered to 
eliminate the grey areas surrounding the calculation of fair value for appraisal right. The law 
could be amended to indemnify bona fide shareholders against the cost of suit in a derivative 
action or oppressive remedy. Finally, the law can be easily amended to insert provisions clearly 
stating the availability of alternative dispute resolution for company disputes of any nature.  
Until such a time as and when these areas are attended to the protection of minority 
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